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The endurance of a significant federal government role in
health care into the late 1980s is remarkable, given the factors which
seemed so likely to herald a new era of reduced central government in-
volvement in health and countless other areas of domestic policy. Quite
aside from the prospects for realignment and the overwhelming political
success of a president with an abiding personal commitment to just such
a &dquo;defederalization&dquo; strategy, spiraling health care costs and federal bud-
get deficits seemed to augur not only a reduced role for the public sector
in health care but, in particular, a reduced role for the central government.
Health care was not a dominant issue in either the 1980 or 1984 election
campaigns, but one congressional leader declared in 1981 that &dquo;Ronald
Reagan’s selection may have its most radical impact on the health care
industry.&dquo; This assertion may ultimately prove true, but if so it will be
attributable to a transformation-and in some respects an intensifica-
tion-of the federal role in health care, rather than a decided step away
from federal involvement in the American health care system.
This resiliency of the federal government role in health care extends
to all aspects of its relation with the nations health care system, state and
local governments, and health-related social and economic activity. This
pattern encompasses federally funded and regulated categorical and block
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grant programs in health care, as well as direct federal regulation of health
care delivery and public health functions such as environmental protec-
tion. It suggests an enduring role for the central government in health
policy, albeit one that increasingly emphasizes cost containment rather
than service expansion or equalization.
ATTEMPTING TO DEFEDERALIZE
The Reagan strategy to defederalize American health care consisted
of three general lines of attack that, if fully accepted and implemented,
would indeed have shriveled the involvement of the central government
in the system. Each portion of the strategy succeeded in certain respects,
but, as we shall see, the overall impact was reduced by a variety of
institutional, political, and philosophical factors. Nonetheless, the very
emergence of such a concerted effort to defederalize American health care
constituted an unprecedented challenge to a concentration of central gov-
ernment authority that had accumulated gradually over almost a half-
century. -
DECENTRALIZATION
One aspect of this defederalization strategy stemmed from a per-
ception that, to the extent the public sector could play an appropriate role
in health care at all, its activities should be concentrated at subnational
levels of government. In particular, many politicians and policy analysts
in the late 1970s and early 1980s increasingly perceived states to be linch-
pins of the federal system and the logical focal point for public sector
involvement in health care. The Reagan era version of decentralization
thus differed from the local government orientation of the earlier Nixon
administration decentralization efforts. This transfer of authority to state
governments could be accomplished through a number of legislative
changes, including outright dismantling of existing federal categorical
programs and consolidating multiple categoricals into broadly defined
block grants that states could allocate for multiple purposes. There was
no more enthusiastic proponent of this multifaceted approach to decen-
tralization than President Reagan, who explained in 1981:
I have a dream of my own. I think block grants are only the inter-
mediate step. I dream of the day when the federal government can
substitute for [block grants] the turning back to local and state gov-
ernments of the tax sources we ourselves have preempted at the
federal level so that you would have those tax sources. (Cannon and
Dewar 1981) .
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A variety of decentralization proposals were made during the first
Reagan administration, including one recommendation for a grand swap
of control over various grant-in-aid and entitlement programs accom-
panied by tax tumbacks, that was the centerpiece of his 1982 State of the
Union address (McKay 1985, pp. 183-89). All of these were consistent
, with what David Walker, formerly of the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, has characterized as &dquo;an almost wholly de-
volutionary approach ... to achieving its prescribed cure of intergovern-
mental decongestion’ (Walker 1983, p. 3). Health care programs were
important components in all of these proposals, but they were not nec-
essarily slated for the most far-reaching decentralization.
DEREGULATION
The Reagan defederalization strategy called for far more than shifting
authority over programs of the central government to the states. Numer-
ous proposals were made to weaken the capacity of federal bureaus and
agencies that regulated both health care delivery and the social and eco-
nomic activity which threatened public health. Health Systems Agencies
and the certificate-of-need process as well as the health-related regulatory
activities of such bodies as the Food and Drug Administration, the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and the Federal Trade Commission faced a series of assaults.
Vice-President Bush directed a task force charged with reversing or weak-
ening those regulations perceived as most onerous to business and in-
dustry ; individuals opposed to the basic mission of certain bureaus or
agencies were appointed to leadership positions; and proposals were
made to reduce dramatically funding for many organizational operations.
All of these actions constituted an effort to reduce or eliminate the reg-
ulatory burden on many industries, including regulatory activity with a
direct role in health care or with a direct impact on public health.
DEDISTRIBUTION
Both the decentralization and deregulation proposals had fairly
lengthy periods of incubation. They were buttressed by a growing body
of highly critical policy research and increasing public skepticism con-
cerning the federal role in domestic policy that created a context in which
far-reaching changes could be proposed by a popular national leader.
Various decentralization proposals, calling for a shift from central to local
government control, had been offered and some had been accepted dur-
ing the Nixon administration, and deregulation was a popular topic dur-
40
ing the Carter years. But the third aspect of the Reagan strategy was
perhaps most novel and radical. Indeed, the mere mention of the idea of
taking away benefits or entitlement to health care services for such po-
litically potent constituencies as senior citizens was almost revolutionary.
Governments are generally adept at creating and distributing govern-
mental benefits, whether direct subsidies or services. The central govern-
ment has no rival in the American context in this regard.
It is almost wholly inexperienced, by contrast, in &dquo;dedistributing&dquo;
such benefits and services, particularly the transfer of them from politi-
cally important constituencies to such broad efforts as national defense
improvement or deficit reduction (Light 1985). It is one thing, for example,
to shift responsibility for a specific health care program from the federal
government to state government (decentralization) or to weaken restric-
tions on the research and promotional activities of pharmaceutical com-
panies (deregulation). It is another step entirely, however, to openly discuss
reducing or eliminating direct forms of central government assistance to
individuals through entitlement programs such as Medicare or Social
Security. Although these types of alternatives were advanced more gin-
gerly than other aspects of their defederalization strategy, various efforts
of the Reagan administration attempted to legitimize serious consider-
ation of dedistribution, whether through increasing the eligibility age for
receiving Medicare and Social Security benefits or through even more
radical proposals such as privatization of Social Security or transforming
Medicare into a catastrophic-oriented or voucher-based program.
STEPS TOWARD
DEFEDERALIZATION
The Reagan administration strategy to reduce the federal govern-
ment role in health care has not been easy to adopt. Some decentraliza-
tion, deregulation and dedistribution has occurred, but what is most
striking about the federal system of the mid-1980s is how much it con-
tinues to resemble the system of the late 1970s. Although the first half of
the 1980s was dominated by talk of fundamental political realignment and
by the seemingly inexhaustible popularity of a president with an abiding
commitment to transfer authority to state governments and the private
sector, the central government role in health care remains substantial.
Defederalization efforts have not been entirely sidetracked. A num-
ber of changes have occurred during the 1980s, particularly in the first
half of the first Reagan term, that reduced certain aspects of the central
government role and seemed to set the stage for additional alteration of
the federal role in health care. Some decentralization was accomplished,
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for example, through the consolidation of numerous categorical programs,
many of which were highly restrictive, into new block grants that were
intended to maximize state discretion in the use of central government
. dollars for health-related services. These changes paralleled in many re-
spects the decentralization efforts of the Nixon years, in which General
Revenue Sharing was established and major block grants were created for
employment training and community development. The number of fed-
eral categorical programs shrank from 539 in fiscal year 1980 to 404 in
fiscal year 1984. Health care categoricals were not exempt from this pro-
cess : 21 programs were compressed into four new block grants that re-
ceived significantly less funding than the combined costs of the earlier
programs. Programs that had focused on high blood pressure, risk re-
duction and health education, venereal disease, immunization, fluori-
dation, rat control, lead-based paint poisoning prevention, and family
planning services, for example, were consolidated into a Preventive Health
Services Block Grant.
Many of the programs that survived consolidation were altered so
as to give states greater influence over their operation. States gained con-
siderable new authority over Medicaid, as federal policy changes enabled
them to contract with less expensive hospitals and physicians; limit the
service choices of program recipients; reimburse hospitals differently and
at lower levels than before; decide who should receive coverage under
optional eligibility categories; offer various community-based services in
place of nursing home care; and more easily acquire waivers to experi-
ment with alternative methods for service delivery (Altman and Morgan
1983; Freund 1984). The central government role in Medicaid funding also
declined, as the federal share of program costs was reduced by 3.0 to 4.5
percent annually between fiscal years 1982 and 1985, and more than one
million people were declared ineligible for Medicaid through legislated
rule changes. Moreover, some have argued that the decentralization ef-
forts of the Reagan administration have gone so far as to have &dquo;largely
broken the link between the distribution of Medicaid funds and state
compliance with federal Medicaid requirements&dquo; (Mashaw and Rose-Ack-
erman 1984, p. 114).
Some degree of deregulation was also achieved in the early 1980s.
Health Systems Agencies were rendered impotent by substantial funding
cuts, halting a major experiment in central government-sponsored health
planning. The Reagan administration also took full advantage of its ap-
pointment powers to stock regulatory agencies and bureaus holding health-
related duties with officials who were devoted to the cause of deregula-
tion. This strategy had its most dramatic impact on environmental policy
with the appointment of controversial figures such as Anne Gorsuch and
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Rita Lavelle to the Environmental Protection Agency, but it also resulted
in significant changes in the interpretation and enforcement of regulatory
responsibilities in numerous other agencies and bureaus. The Office of
Management and Budget gained unprecedented authority over the activ-
ities of health-related regulatory agencies in 1981 through Reagans Ex-
ecutive Order 12291 that provided it with superagency stature and
mandated cost-benefit analysis in the agencies.
Furthermore, seemingly impregnable entitlement programs of the
central government such as Social Security and Medicare, which directly
assist formidable political constituencies, were exposed to unprecedented
dedistributive pressures. Policy change was particularly extensive in So-
cial Security: the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act eliminated the
minimum benefit for both new and current recipients and phased out
benefits for postsecondary students 18 years or older, and the legislative
package developed by the 1983 Bipartisan Commission on Social Security
Reform authorized a gradual increase in the standard retirement age to
67 beginning in the year 2000 and the taxation of program benefits for
high-income individuals and couples. The Medicare program escaped
such extensive dedistributive changes, but both the hospital and physi-
cian deductibles were increased in 1982, among other modifications. In
addition, the recommendation of the Bowen Commission on Medicare to
raise the eligibility age to 67 and the mounting concern over the adequacy
of the programs trust fund suggest continuing pressure for change. As
R. Kent Weaver has noted, &dquo;the direction of entitlement policy choices
has shifted; a long-term trend toward expanded eligibility has been re-
versed&dquo; (Weaver 1985, pp. 307-8). Health care entitlements were consis-
tent with this pattern.
LIMITS TO DEFEDERALIZATION
These changes produced an American health care system that, in
certain respects, was less central govemment-oriented but hardly trans-
formed by the late 1980s. Despite all the forces that seemed to indicate
not only health care defederalization but fundamental political realign-
ment, the kinds of changes that have occurred are more the stuff of in-
crementalism than policy revolution. On the whole, relatively little shift
of authority from Washington to state governments and the private sector
occurred, and a number of developments suggest that the future role of
the federal government in health care may stabilize or gradually increase
rather than be decisively reduced. After exploring the failure to transform
the federal role in health care, I shall consider the complicated set of factors
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that must converge for major shifts in policy to occur and how these
factors did not converge (and are unlikely to do so) in this policy area.
LIMITS TO DECENTRALIZATION
, There has been no grand transfer of authority or resources from the
federal to subfederal levels of government in health care or in many other
areas of domestic policy. Block grant creation, categorical program tink-
ering, and certain funding reductions notwithstanding, most of the major
federal activities in health care have changed surprisingly little since 1980.
This is consistent with the overall pattern of federal grants, since more
than 80 percent of federal aid remains in categorical programs (Lovell
1985, p. 613) and the vast majority of regulatory provisions previously
attached to those programs remain in force. David Beam, formerly of the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, concludes
that &dquo;the basic contours of the federal system are not markedly different.
No real devolution of power has been accomplished&dquo; (Beam 1985, p. 589).
After early efforts at decentralization either trimmed, eliminated, or
consolidated the most politically vulnerable and smallest health care pro-
grams, further changes proved more difficult to achieve. The health block
grants encompassed fewer categorical programs, contained more funding,
and featured far more regulatory restrictions than originally proposed.
Many regulatory provisions normally attached to categorical programs
were ultimately affixed to one or more of the new health care block grants,
including &dquo;maintenance of effort&dquo; and &dquo;supplement not supplant&dquo; restric-
tions on funding usage, matching and reporting requirements, limits
on expenditures for administrative costs, and citizen participation re-
quirements. Although designed as vehicles for decentralization, these
block grants borrowed heavily from their categorical, federally oriented
predecessors.
Nor were these initial changes stepping-stones to more profound
alterations of federal grants. The most ambitious decentralization strategy,
the &dquo;New Federalism&dquo; proposed by Reagan, was not particularly threat-
ening to the federal role in health care and, moreover, was politically
stillborn. This proposal called for a swap of three major programs, with
the federal government assuming full responsibility for Medicaid while
states would take full responsibility for AFDC and food stamps. This
component would actually have increased the federal role in health care,
but would have been offset by a tumback to the states of some 61 federal
programs as well as some of the revenues (tax sources) to pay for them.
However, the proposal quickly dropped from political sight and no equally
comprehensive scheme of decentralization has been forthcoming.
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LIMITS TO DEREGULATION
The deregulatory fervor that transformed telecommunications, avia-
tion, trucking, and other industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s had
little transferability to social regulation. Health Systems Agencies and
Professional Standards Review Organizations were phased out, but new
and more forceful central government regulatory programs emerged at
the same time. The federal government terminated subsidies to Health
Maintenance Organizations, but continued to evaluate those seeking fed-
eral qualification status and devised new measures to stimulate enroll-
ment in HMOs by Medicare and Medicaid recipients. The number of
HMOs deemed federally qualified soared from 42 in 1977 to 128 in 1981
to 310 in 1985. Moreover, most aspects of social regulation linked to health
remain largely unchanged. As the decade nears its end, any deregulatory
momentum seems to have been reversed in favor of continued or inten-
sified federal regulatory efforts.
Reducing regulatory competence through budget cuts and weak-
ening commitment to regulation through appointment of officials op-
posed to the basic mission of their bureau or agency proved to be the
principal Reagan approach to health-related deregulation. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency were particularly affected by this strategy. But, in the process,
most of the legislation underlying the social regulatory activity of the
federal government was never seriously challenged. Moreover, the adverse
publicity attracted by some of the actions of controversial officials and the
seemingly resilient public commitment to strong social and health regu-
latory policy triggered a political backlash that appears to have pushed
serious discussion of health-related deregulation off the political agenda.
Rather than being a &dquo;watershed in social regulation&dquo;, this period has been
characterized as ua detour on the road to regulatory reform&dquo; (Eads and Fix
1984, p. xiv).
LIMITS TO DEDISTRIBUTION
The steps toward dedistribution were profound in that they began
to withdraw previously authorized federal entitlement benefits but were
modest in impact. Some entitlement programs were significantly reduced
during the first Reagan term, such as trade adjustment assistance, guar-
anteed student loans, child nutrition, and food stamps, but health care
entitlements emerged relatively unscathed. During the period from 1975
to 1984, described by R. Kent Weaver as a time of entitlement &dquo;consoli-
dation and retrenchment&dquo;, health care entitlements continued to increase
their share of the total federal budget, although at a declining rate from
the prior decade (Weaver 1985).
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Overall health spending by the central government has continued.
to increase since the late 1970s, driven by the growth of Medicare, Med-
icaid, veterans’ care, and health research. It soared from $73 billion in
1981 to $109 billion in 1985, well above the inflation rate during this
period. Even as national defense, Social Security, and interest payments
, consume an ever growing percentage of total federal government outlays
during the 1980s, the percentage of the budget devoted to health programs
continued to climb. It grew from 10.1 percent in 1977 to 10.8 percent in
1981, reached a record 11.5 percent in 1985, and is expected to attain even
higher levels in the late 1980s (Table 1).
TABLE 1 Health Program and Overall Federal Budget Outlays, and
Health Program Outlays as Percentage of Overall Outlays,
1977-1986 (billions of current dollars)
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government,




Defederalization was further mitigated by a number of develop-
ments that called for a greater central government role in health care. At
the very time that decentralization, deregulation, and dedistribution ini-
tiatives were moving slowly if at all through the political system, federal
involvement in health care was expanded or intensified in certain re-
spects. This refederalization of American health care constituted yet an-
other twist on what Thomas Anton has characterized as a &dquo;gradual
augmentation of national government power&dquo; that has occurred since the
New Deal (Anton 1984, p. 23). Rather than simply ’expand federal re-
sponsibility for health care service delivery or health regulation on an
incremental basis, the federal government in the 1980s latched onto a
significant new tool for guiding the health care system and assumed new
areas of regulatory involvement.
The most profound development was the creation of prospective
payment based on Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) in the Medicare
program in 1983. This regulatory tool gives the federal bureaucracy, sub-
ject to congressional oversight, the authority to establish in advance rates
of reimbursement for hospitals that serve Medicare patients. Rather than
transfer rate-setting authority to the marketplace (as would a deregulatory
strategy) or to state government (as would many decentralization strate-
gies), the DRG process gives unprecedented authority to the central gov-
ernment. The Department of Health and Human Services has used DRGs
as the principal component of its strategy to contain Medicare costs. That
strategy eschews withdrawing benefits from recipients in favor of apply-
ing pressure on service providers to make them work more efficiently.
This new tool might have been used cautiously given the general anti-
central government climate and Washington% traditional reluctance to
disrupt providers, but DRGs have quickly become a cornerstone of the
federal health care regulatory effort. James Morone and Andrew Dunham
have noted that it &dquo;is striking how quickly federal officials began squeez-
ing DRG payments to hospitals&dquo; (Morone and Dunham 1985, p. 277).
The long-term potential of DRGs for expanding and intensifying the
central government role in health care does not lie merely in its current
application to hospitals under the Medicare program. Morone and Dun-
ham even suggest that DRGs could constitute a &dquo;slouching towards na-
tional health insurance&dquo;, with this approach being gradually expanded to
other areas, such as Medicare physician payments, Medicaid and, con-
ceivably, all reimbursement to hospitals and physicians (Morone and
Dunham 1985, p. 277). This would be entirely consistent with the gradual
expansion of the central government role in health care over recent de-
cades, with a new round of incrementalism launched from the starting
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point of DRGs now that the more traditional focus on expanding delivery
of health care services to populations with special needs seems to have
ended. DRGs may, in fact, epitomize a new form of health care regulation
that involves both federal and state governments, in which regulatory
approaches are designed to foster greater competition among service pro-
- viders while relying heavily on governmental rules to establish and gov-
ernmental officials to interpret the conditions under which competition
may take place. They closely resemble many of the hospital regulatory
programs devised by many state governments in the past decade (Brown,
forthcoming).
The advent of DRGs has been accompanied by federal sponsorship
of Peer Review Organizations (PROs) to monitor the quality of care pro-
vided to Medicare beneficiaries. Rather than simply peel away the pro-
cedures established previously through Professional Standards Review
Organizations in pursuit of a reduced regulatory role, the federal govern-
ment has established a more rigorous peer review process whereby PROs
may refuse to authorize Medicare funding for hospital services deemed
unnecessary and may determine in advance whether surgical procedures
are appropriate for a patient.
Other new federal government regulatory efforts in health care ex-
tend beyond Medicare. Legislation signed into law in early 1986 estab-
lished new federal requirements that prevent hospitals from rejecting
emergency room patients or ’dumping&dquo; them on other institutions out of
fear that these individuals will be unable to pay their bills. Another pro-
vision of the same legislation requires an 18-month continuation of health
insurance coverage for laid-off workers in firms with 20 or more employ-
ees. It also requires a three-year extension of coverage for families of
workers who die. The recipients of the extended coverage would pay the
premiums, but would do so at the lower group rate. Proposals to expand
these new provisions will be considered in the One Hundredth Congress.
The federal government has also expanded its involvement in a num-
ber of regulatory areas related to health. Congress has been particularly
emphatic about maintaining or intensifying the rigor of national environ-
mental legislation such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Clean Air
Act. Such legislation is drafted with increasingly specific deadlines and
requirements and is routinely exposed to detailed interpretation by the
federal judiciary.
Even the Reagan administration in some instances has abetted an
expansion of regulatory authority. Among those efforts related to health,
the administration has sought to expand federal authority over abortion, ,
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care of handicapped infants, interstate transport of hazardous products,
and commercial use of hazardous substances such as lead and asbestos.
It has also supported legislation to link full allocation of federal highway
construction funds to states’ acceptance of a 21-year-old drinking age.
Additional central government involvement may be forthcoming in reg-
ulation of physician fees, organ transplants, medical liability, drug abuse
control, and restrictions on the tobacco industry. And, in a move almost
unthinkable in an era purportedly devoted to seeking noncentral govern-
ment solutions to health care and health-related problems, President Rea-
gan in February 1987 embraced a proposal to expand Medicare to cover
the &dquo;catastrophic&dquo; costs of acute illness, and members of Congress have
begun to explore even more expansive program alternatives. Alongside
the generally modest results of decentralization, deregulation and dedis-
tribution efforts, these efforts to increase the central government role




The signs of refederalization of American health care are all the more
striking in contrast to the era of defederalization that appeared so likely
in the early 1980s. Few periods in the twentieth century have loomed as
such promising &dquo;windows of opportunity&dquo; for far-reaching change in
public policy. The New Deal and Great Society were created when such
windows opened, and the defederalized society envisioned by Ronald
Reagan seemed within striking distance in early 1981 when he assumed
office.
But policy formation, particularly when it involves major shifts of
direction, is a complicated and difficult process. Analysts of this process
have emphasized that various conditions must converge before policy
formation can occur; a popular president with a popular message is not
necessarily sufficient. Instead, political factors must augur well for new
policy, ideas that are well grounded and widely accepted must be avail-
able for translation into specific policy proposals, a problem or crisis must
exist to which a policy proposal can be attached and thereby legitimized,
and skillful policy entrepreneurs must embrace the policy proposal and
shepherd it through the formation process (Kingdon 1984). Without a
convergence of such factors, policy formation is likely to be confined to
tinkering with existing policies rather than making major shifts in course
and taking dramatic new initiatives. In the case of the Reagan defeder-
alization strategy, no such convergence took place. By contrast, it did
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occur in the formation of the most significant federal health care inno-
vation of the 1980s to date, the DRG-based Prospective Payment System
that may lead to an expanded central government involvement in health
care.
POLITICS ,
The principal political force behind defederalization,was Ronald Rea-
gan, but even his exceptional political popularity and skill were insuf-
ficient to defederalize American health policy. A president enjoys
considerable authority, especially early in a term, but that authority can
be extended to only so many policy priorities. And since that authority
normally wanes during a term of office, those priorities must be carefully
selected and adroitly pursued (Light 1982). Sensitive to these realities,
Reagan emphasized tax cuts, defense spending increases, and domestic
spending reductions. The last of these goals had some impact on health
care, particularly through program cuts made in the 1981 Omnibus Bud-
get Reconciliation Act, but it also inspired the search for new regulatory
tools such as DRGs and PROs. Nonetheless, the defederalization strategy
was generally treated as a lesser overall priority, especially as applied to
health care. By the time Reagan proposed a New Federalism in his 1982
State of the Union address, he was engulfed in controversy over proposed
dedistribution of Social Security benefits, beginning to slide in public
opinion polls, facing a weakening economy, and about to lose his work-
ing majority in the House of Representatives. And even this sweeping
proposal would have traded a reduced federal role in certain health care
programs for a more dominant role in Medicaid.
Reagan remained supportive of defederalization, but more on the
margins than as a central policy priority. Even after the restoration of his
political popularity and his resounding reelection, Reagan did not place
defederalization high on his agenda. Not only had earlier attempts in this
area largely fizzled, but the president established other priorities such as
income tax reform and arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union.
He also faced a number of political setbacks, including the Iran-Contra
scandal, that impaired his capacity to set the national agenda as forcefully
as he had during his first term.
With less than robust political backing from the executive branch,
defederalization faced formidable political opposition. One of the most
important developments in American public policy in the last quarter-
century has been &dquo;the relative autonomy of political institutions&dquo; (March
and Olsen 1984). These institutions need not be dependent on social and
political developments such as electoral support or public opinion, and
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can exercise considerable political influence, particularly in specialized
areas where their expertise is unrivaled.
Whether one chooses to call the structured alliance of these insti-
tutions &dquo;subgovernments&dquo;, &dquo;iron triangles&dquo;, or &dquo;issue networks&dquo;, they have
proven to be well entrenched in federal health care policy. These health
care institutions include congressional committees and subcommittees,
federal and subfederal bureaucracies, and relevant pressure groups. After
the policy breakthrough that facilitated the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid in 1965, &dquo;policy making in health became placid and routinized,
with low public visibility and few disruptive controversies,&dquo; according to
Edward Laumann and his colleagues (Laumann, Knoke, and Kim 1985,
p. 5). This pattern was particularly evident when these authors compared
the process of policy formation in health care to the less institutionalized
and more turbulent process of policy formation in energy, and it suggests
that the health care policy process may be unusually resistant to signifi-
cant change.
Congress proved to be a particularly formidable ally to the federal
bureaucracy and pressure groups. The split-level nature of the political
realignment in the 1980s left the House of Representatives in Democratic
hands, assuring at least some continued commitment to the central gov-
ernment approaches that the Reagan administration found so unaccept-
able. But more important, the enduring fragmentation of congressional
authority into dozens of committees and subcommittees in both cham-
bers provided considerable protection for existing health care programs,
institutions, and regulatory approaches (Davidson 1981). After commit-
tees had developed particular expertise in and influence over focused
areas of health care policy, they were extremely reluctant to transform
those areas and perhaps eliminate them outright. By the mid-1980s, the
most influential federal policymakers in health care included congres-
sional leaders of both parties, such as David Durenberger, John Heinz,
Fortney Stark, and Henry Waxman, who used the committees and sub-
committees that they chaired to offer policy alternatives that deviated
significantly from those supported by the Reagan administration.
Many congressional committees minimized the impact of defeder-
alization by accepting only those changes that were emphasized early by
the Reagan administration. Granting the political imperative of cutting
domestic spending in 1981, many committees used their authority under
the budget reconciliation process to stretch required cuts over a large
number of programs and agencies. In the process, they retained the au-
thority to preserve most of the basic procedures and regulations for these
programs. For many programs thus protected structurally in 1981 and
1982, Congress managed to restore in 1983, 1984, and 1985 some of the
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funding that had been cut and reinserted certain regulatory provisions
that had been removed. The Ninety-eighth Congress proved particularly
adept at using hearings to rally opposition to further cutbacks of health
care programs designed to assist low-income groups.
The Reagan budget victory in 1981, therefore, was &dquo;more a triumph
-in his war against overall federal domestic spending than a successful
strike against centralized federalism and the congressional structure that
supports it&dquo; (Chubb 1985, p. 290). This was particularly true in health
policy. And after Reagans early domestic triumphs had had little impact
on defederalization, the natural forces of declining presidential influence,
congressional resilience to nonincremental change, Democratic gains in
the 1982 and 1986 elections, and bureaucratic preferences for the prevail-
ing order deflated any subsequent plans for decentralization, deregulation,
or dedistribution in American health care.
IDEAS
The absence of ideas that were well accepted and readily transferable
into viable policy proposals also undermined defederalization. Although
critics of the prevailing federal order found it relatively easy to offer con-
demnation, they were much less effective in articulating comprehensible
and politically acceptable alternatives. No clear strategy emerged that out-
lined the ways in which the Reagan administration intended to redirect
the federal system. This was in marked contrast to the more careful idea
development that guided Nixon administration efforts in redesigning fed-
eral grants and that brought issues of federalism to &dquo;a high point of con-
ceptualization&dquo; (Palmer 1984, p. 21). Instead, defederalization Reagan-style
was pursued in ad hoc fashion, using available political tools to scrape
away federal authority where possible, whether trimming budgets of
health care programs with the least political support or stocking regula-
tory agencies with officials who shared the administrations antipathy
toward the existing system.
The importance of well-defined ideas in policy formation for defed-
eralization is illustrated by the breakthroughs in federal economic dereg-
ulation that occurred in the late 1970s. Decades of research by political
scientists and economists had revealed fundamental shortcomings in fed-
eral efforts to regulate various industries. This provided a solid base of
ideas that legitimized radical deregulation of industries such as aviation,
telecommunications, and trucking (Derthick and Quirk 1985; Page 1983).
These changes had little if any impact on health care, but did illustrate
that substantial defederalization was possible in which federal regulatory
authority was eliminated in favor of competition.
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It proved much more difficult to chart a federal social deregulatory
course for public or semipublic goods such as health care and public
health protection. Whereas the deregulated market could be relied on to
provide an adequate supply of telecommunication services, the outcomes
of health-related deregulation were much more unpredictable and poten-
tially dangerous for society. It remains unclear just how a deregulated
health care system or environment would function, largely because few
coherent ideas have emerged that would explain or guide that change.
There has been extensive discussion about devising market-based strat-
egies to facilitate social deregulation, but most proposals remain opaque
at best. As George Eads and Michael Fix (1984) of the Urban Institute
observed:
The problem is that no one knows what such legislation would look
like. Economists have not yet met the challenge of specifying where
and how their proposals could be implemented in sufficient detail
to permit legislative changes to be drawn up. Neither have econo-
mists seriously addressed the ethical and political objections that
have been raised to the use of market-like mechanisms. (P. 260)
And in the few instances in which such approaches have been attempted,
such as emissions trading under the Clean Air Act, they have not per-
formed as.smoothly or effectively as theory would suggest (Liroff 1986).
A number of years after federal economic deregulation has been imple-
’ 
mented, drawing heavily on the ideas of social scientists, the ideas used
to support social deregulation proposals remain too murky to be trans-
lated readily into policy.
The generation of mature ideas that would foster either decentrali-
zation or dedistribution has been similarly slow. Despite periodic dis-
cussion of a grand &dquo;sorting out&dquo; of intergovernmental responsibilities in
health care and other areas of domestic policy, the analysis of intergov-
emmental relations and the proper distribution of authority among fed-
eral, state, and local levels of government have generally lacked any guiding
theory or principles. Numerous reform proposals were developed in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, including those advanced by the National
Governors Association and the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations. Many of these advocated some sort of decentrali-
zation, but none offered a compelling set of alternatives. In an exhaustive
review of the research on American federalism, Thomas Anton concluded,
&dquo;To the extent that recent authors have contributed anything innovative,
it is a new mood of pessimism, derived from largely implicit images of
despair&dquo; (Anton 1984, p. 16).
The Reagan administration was generally sympathetic to many of
these decentralization proposals, but its own pronouncements on feder-
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alism lacked, according to Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise
Institute, &dquo;a set of guiding principles or criteria that add up to a coherent
theory of federalism&dquo;. Barfield, a leading advocate of decentralization,
also emphasized that the Reagan administration &dquo;has proceeded in a
piecemeal fashion and has not set forth ... its long-range goals concem-
ing federalism in any detail&dquo; (Barfield 1981, p. 62). Even the New Feder-
alism Reagan proposed in 1982 did not deviate from this pattern, as the
suggested set of changes were &dquo;simply another device for reducing federal
spending&dquo; rather than a coherent effort to reorient intergovernmental re-
sponsibilities according to &dquo;criteria of economic efficiency, increased ac-
countability, administrative rationality or equity’ (McKay 1985, p. 202;
Peterson, Rabe, and Wong 1986, chapter 1). The proposal treated health
care and welfare policy as divisible among governments, concentrating
responsibility for Medicaid in Washington, D.C. and authority for dozens
of other closely related programs in state governments.
The emergence of ideas based on such criteria would not, of course,
automatically lead to policy formation that reflected them, since so many
other factors are involved in that process. But the absence of ideas that
could be reshaped into viable policy proposals limited any potential im-
pact for decentralization or deregulation. Ideas that might shape and fa-
cilitate dedistribution were also poorly conceptualized, as little systematic
thought has been devoted to the ways in which well-established central
governmental benefits are best reduced.
The approach to Social Security dedistribution in 1983 may offer
some lessons, in that a fairly straightforward set of options consisting
primarily of different ways to reduce benefits or increase taxes had been
examined, their impact was readily quantified, and they were made avail-
able to a bipartisan national commission. This body received a clear
charge to do something about the programs serious funding problem and
included an unusually powerful array of elected and appointed officials
of the executive and legislative branches, who were allowed to forge a
compromise during proceedings that were unusually secretive for the
post-Watergate era (Light 1985). Although this may be a more effective
method for dedistribution than simply hacking federal spending in cer-
tain programs, it does not provide a clear understanding of who deserves
what from the federal government. Without coherent, well-accepted ideas
to guide those decisions, dedistribution, like deregulation and decentral-
ization, is not likely to go far.
PROBLEMS
Policy formation also requires the emergence of serious problems,
often a crisis, to which ideas can be offered as a solution and around
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which political forces can coalesce. Kingdon has characterized such prob-
lems as &dquo;triggering events&dquo; that lead to a search for solutions and often
result in new policy (Kingdon 1984). Just as problems of communicable
disease triggered an expanded governmental role in public health in prior
generations, new problems such as the alarming spread of acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) today prompt considerable govern-
mental activity at federal, state, and local levels.
But what was the problem that would trigger an effort to defeder-
alize American health care? The cost of health care was indeed high and
growing rapidly, attributable in part to federal programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid. But the very nature of the American health care system
obscured many of these costs to the consumer. And while public opinion
surveys showed considerable concern about the cost of health care, the
American public has repeatedly demonstrated satisfaction with the care
that it receives and has not perceived rising costs as a leading national
problem. Opinion surveys also indicate that the public does not want any
government-sponsored changes in the system to disrupt the care that is
available (Blendon and Altman 1984). They further suggest that most
Americans are opposed to deregulation in areas such as environmental
health and dedistribution in popular programs such as Medicare and
Social Security (Mitchell 1984).
It is difficult to discern any widespread perception that health care
is a problem-laden area in need of extensive defederalization. In fact,
since national health insurance has ceased to be a seriously considered
issue, there has not been a single, attention-riveting problem in health
,care or federal health care policy that would trigger far-reaching defed-
eralization. Those who bemoan &dquo;supermarbleization and hyperintergov-
ernmentalization&dquo;, deem the federal system to be ’out of control&dquo; (Walker
1981) and advocate defederalization may strike a responsive chord with
those who have to fill out complicated forms to obtain funding through
federal programs or to comply with program regulations. Likewise, those
who deem federal budget deficits to be long-term threats to economic
well-being may be supportive of dedistribution. But these problems have
not proved sufficient to attract extensive political support, to launch a
search for policy ideas, or to culminate in far-reaching new steps in health
policy formation.
To the extent that major problems or crises have emerged since 1980,
they are likely to lead to greater or continued federal and subfederal au-
thority rather than less. Insofar as policy has changed at all in response
to the continuing growth of total health care costs and government budget
pressures, it has involved expanded and intensified regulation at both
the central and state government levels. The mounting environmental
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health concern triggered by toxic substances and hazardous wastes has
put enormous pressure on legislators and regulatory officials to expand
and intensify central government involvement. This problem has led to
extensive state and local activity too. Furthermore, the widely publicized
problems of America’s poor, .particularly the homeless and unemployed,
, have made it politically difficult to consider further reductions in federal
health care and other programs that assist them. Even the leading grants-
in-aid reform proposal currently on the national legislative agenda, the
proposed Federalism Act of 1987 that follows the recommendations of the
Committee on Federalism and National Purpose, would give the central
government virtually complete responsibility for funding Medicaid, ex-
pand the scope of services and eligibility for the program, and also create
a major new program in long-term care. In turn, many programs would
be eliminated or consolidated, but the vast majority of these do not in-
volve health care.
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS
A fourth component of policy formation-skillful and influential
policy entrepreneurs who can pull together politics, ideas and problems
into new policy-was also lacking in the case of defederalization in
American health care. Whereas the formation of Medicare was attributable
in part to entrepreneurs such as Lyndon Johnson and Wilbur Cohen and
airline deregulation was attributable in part to the entrepreneurial talents
of Alfred Kahn, no such leaders emerged to guide the various components
of defederalization.
The most obvious and potentially influential entrepreneurs were too
occupied with other business to champion such change. President Reagan
was the most likely entrepreneur, given his long-standing opposition to
a substantial central government role in health care and most areas of
domestic policy. Having opposed the enactment of Medicare in the 1960s,
for example, Reagan supported radical revision of the program as an off-
and-on presidential candidate in the 1970s. But Reagan was too devoted
to the leading issues on his agenda, particularly income tax cuts and a
national defense buildup, to focus consistently and intensely on health
care defederalization. To the extent that domestic budget cuts became a
political necessity as the budget deficit soared, Reagan was somewhat
more involved. But he was never willing to risk much political capital in
such an unpopular area, particularly when it came to cutting popular
programs with large middle-class support, including Medicare, Veterans
Administration health care, and medical research.
At the same time, those Reagan lieutenants directly responsible for
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advancing defederalization were among the least politically effective
members of the administration. Potential entrepreneurs of defederaliza-
tion in health care, such as cabinet-level officials and regulatory agency
heads, lacked the stature and political skill necessary for the task. De-
partment of Health and Human Services secretaries Richard Schweiker,
Margaret Heckler, and Otis Bowen were not particularly influential mem-
bers of the Reagan cabinet. Among leaders of health-related federal agen-
cies and bureaus, Anne Gorsuch at EPA, Frank Young at FDA, and Thomas
Auchter at OSHA had neither the political credibility nor the skill to
guide a deregulation revolution. By contrast, the real policy entrepreneurs
of the Reagan administration, such as James Baker and David Stockman,
devoted relatively little effort to health care. As discussed earlier, the most
influential entrepreneurs in federal health care policy during the 1980s
were congressional leaders of both parties who did not share the presi-
dents defederalization vision.
Policy entrepreneurship for defederalization was similarly lacking
at the state level. A chorus of senators, representatives, governors, and
state government associations had long railed at the strings attached to
federal programs in health care and other areas of domestic policy, as well
as the central government role in health-related regulation. But, with the
possible exception of former Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt, who pro-
posed a grandiose swap of federal and state functions rather than an
across-the-board reduction of federal responsibility, no particularly influ-
ential entrepreneurs emerged to steer a defederalization strategy to for-
mation. Dedistribution was particularly unpopular once discussion shifted
from generalities to specific program cuts, and state political leaders-
potential entrepreneurs-were chary about staking their careers on pro-
posals to accumulate new health program and regulatory responsibilities
at their level of government. Governors played a particularly decisive role
in scuttling the Reagan New Federalism proposal, deeming it to be fiscally
disadvantageous to the states.
Ambitious state programs in hospital cost containment, which could
ultimately be meshed with Medicare DRGS, were the biggest exception
to this pattern. Indeed, the policy process that produced DRGs, initially
as a Medicare demonstration project in New Jersey and later on a nation-
wide basis, was driven by a convergence of the very factors that were
missing in defederalization. Policy entrepreneurs in state and federal gov-
ernments, including legislators and bureaucrats, were skillful in trans-
forming the basic ideas in DRG-type reimbursement into a workable
policy proposal that might improve on the dismal track record of past.
governmental efforts to contain costs. Officials of the New Jersey De-
partment of Health during the Brendan Byrne administration, particularly
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Commissioner Joanne Finley, were instrumental in developing the DRG
proposal and acquiring the federal agency and state legislative support
needed to put it into operation.
In 1982, Congress ordered the Department of Health and Human
Services through the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act to devise
.a prospective Medicare reimbursement reform that responded to the
mounting problem of program costs. The Health Care Financing Admin-
istration within HHS proposed a variant of the New Jersey DRG exper-
iment that it had funded in the 1970s, and Congress acceded in remarkably
short order (Morone and Dunham 1985). HHS Secretary Richard Schwei-
ker quietly gained the support of key congressional leaders and moved
the proposal quickly past a hospital industry that was divided on the
issue. The House Ways and Means Committee, with the leadership of
chairman Dan Rostenkowski, drafted the bill and gained full committee
and House approval in one day. The Senate Finance Committee and then
the Senate also approved a similar bill, which was signed by the president
in April 1983, less than two months after the House action. There was
minimal discussion and controversy in either chamber of Congress over
this far-reaching reform, and a handful of legislators, working closely
with HHS officials, were instrumental in this rapid policy formation pro-
cess. In short order, the political, idea, and problem factors crucial to policy
formation converged, pulled together by both elected and nonelected




The failure to defederalize American health care serves as a reminder
that far-reaching institutional change is more easily said than done in
American politics. It also suggests that health care occupies a distinct
place on the national political agenda that may protect it from rapid policy
shifts. Health care rarely emerges as the dominant domestic priority of
the president or the Congress. It is unlikely that any president or major
congressional leader will risk his or her reputation with an all-out effort
to transform the federal role in health care, given other pressing issues.
Thus, it will be rare for health care to receive the kind of political atten-
tion, and the devotion of scarce political resources, necessary to facilitate
far-reaching policy change, except under very unusual conditions, such
as those that led to the creation of DRGs.
At the same time, even if health care were emphasized as a high-
priority agenda item, perhaps central to some future effort to slash the
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budget deficit, it retains sufficient independent prominence on the na-
tional political agenda to resist substantial change. If - not such a high
policy priority as to be vulnerable to far-reaching change, health care is
not such a low policy priority as to be easily swept away when political
currents reverse. Indeed, most areas of federal government involvement
in health care retain substantial legislative, bureaucratic, pressure group,
and general public support. It is not surprising, therefore, that defeder-
alization initiatives may have had the greatest impact in those areas of
domestic policy with lower standing on the national political agenda,
such as housing, transportation and nonnuclear energy, and those areas
within health care with the weakest political support, such as small cat-
egorical programs for the disadvantaged (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong 1986,
chapter 9). By contrast, the basic components of the federal government
role in health care are likely to endure given its prominent but not preem-
inent place on the national political agenda.
If slow to change, federal policy toward health care should not be
thought of as impervious to defederalization efforts. It may, in fact, be
permanently influenced by the developments of the early and mid-1980s.
These can be viewed as a series of opportunities lost as well as oppor-
tunities gained.
OPPORTUNITIES LOST: FAILURE TO
SORT OUT THE SYSTEM
The political mood of the early 1980s has not stimulated a thorough
examination of the myriad activities of federal, state, and local govern-
ments in health care or rearranged them in a more orderly fashion. Even
a clear shift of authority away from the central government is not evident.
Lawrence Brown observed in 1984 that &dquo;no endorsement of devolution
is sweeping American political culture&dquo; and &dquo;no orderly and principled
devolution of federal activities is in prospect&dquo; (Brown 1984, p. 107). Such
an assessment remains especially accurate in the context of health care
policy. Where defederalization did occur it was not attributable to any
careful examination of the ways in which central government resources
and regulatory efforts might best be focused. Instead, defederalization
advanced farthest where political opposition to change was weakest. The
principal criteria for decentralizing categorical programs into new block
grants was a minimum of political resistance rather than whether or not
they were efficiently and effectively operated; deregulation was advanced
primarily in those instances where political appointees could slow or
impede regulatory activity rather than where Congress revised regulatory
legislation; dedistribution was accomplished in those programs that were
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deemed politically vulnerable or for which a politically acceptable com-
promise could be struck rather than in those that were proven ineffica-
cious. And, similarly, any steps toward an expanded and intensified federal
government role in health care have occurred on an ad hoc basis rather
than as part of any coherent strategy to redefine federal, state, and local
,responsibilities.
Without such a sorting out of functions, many aspects of the central
government role in health care may have been cemented in, at least for
the rest of this century. Many of the most pressing problems have received
little attention. For example, rather than a period of sorting out respon-
sibilities for Medicaid and more general consideration of providing health
care for the indigent, the 1980s have been a period in which the federal
and state governments remain at loggerheads over such matters. Neither
level seems to know what to do differently, although the program has
many serious shortcomings, including tremendous state-by-state dispar-
ities and huge gaps in eligibility among the lower-income population.
Future prospects for sorting out intergovernmental responsibilities
for health care in a more rational way are dimmed not only by the missed
opportunities of the early 1980s but also by the fiscal realities imposed
by the enormous federal budget deficits. Deficit reduction is likely to
dominate the national political agenda for at least the balance of the de-
cade, and the pressures on the central government to contain spending
place it in a poor bargaining position to entice state and local governments
to explore ways to reorder intergovernmental relations. State government
officials scorned the Reagan New Federalism proposals, for example, when
they recognized that the plan was intended primarily to transfer numer-
ous federal program responsibilities and relatively modest revenue sources.
OPPORTUNITIES GAINED: THE PRESSURE TO
DEDISTRIBUTE AND THE SEARCH FOR INNOVATION
The impact of enormous budget deficits on the federal role in health
care may, however, have far greater long-run consequences than compli-
cating efforts to sort out intergovernmental responsibilities for various
aspects of health care. They may eventually place unprecedented pressure
on the president and Congress to dedistribute extensively. Such pressure,
whether triggered by a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings type procedure, a Con-
stitutional amendment to balance the budget, or an economic decline
attributed to the deficits, may not hit all areas of the budget equally but
will certainly not bypass health care totally. And the prospect of looming
$100 billion deficits in the Medicare trust fund by the late 1990s may even
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make health care programs more vulnerable than other areas of domestic
spending.
But while such pressure might ultimately open a window of op-
portunity to extensive dedistribution, including outright reductions in
federal expenditures, it may also result in a more prudent central govern-
ment role in health care. The federal government will have less money to
spend, but political leaders are unlikely to extricate themselves from re-
sponsibility for popular programs such as health care for the elderly, less-
popular but enduring programs such as health care for the poor, or social
regulatory activities that are designed to protect health. This will trigger
a search for new procedures that will maintain the quality of existing
services and the intensity of current regulations, but at a reduced cost to
the federal government. In particular, this more mature federal role may
emphasize reduced deference to the providers of health care services
while protecting the service needs of special populations.
The DRG system for Medicare may be a prototype of the future
federal role in health care. Acknowledging limits to its resources, the
federal government has deployed a mechanism that gives it unprece-
dented leverage to set priorities-and to influence the direction-in
American health care on the basis of the reimbursement levels it chooses
to establish for various medical procedures. DRGs give the federal gov-
ernment unprecedented authority to ration health care, which has hith-
erto been unthinkable in the American political context (Aaron and
Schwartz 1984). Already applied to hospitals that serve Medicare patients,
further use of DRGs by the federal government in the future could lead
to a far-reaching expansion of its role in health care. States could further
increase their involvement in this process, whether through continued
innovation in hospital cost-containment programs or adoption of DRGs
in Medicaid. But without an exclusively state-funded health care activity
that rivals Medicare in scope, and given the fact that combined state and
local expenditures per capita for health are less than half of federal per
capita expenditures, states will lack the leverage of the federal government
in this area.
DRGs are not the only possible tool for refederalization in American
health care, however. What is striking about virtually all of the major
proposals for far-reaching change in health care is that they call for an
extensive, and often expanded and intensified, role for the federal gov-
ernment. Quite aside from more traditional proposals to expand the cov-
erage of populations with special needs, even those proposals explicitly
intended to foster individual choice among service consumers and com-
petition among service providers are heavily dependent on the federal
government to determine the rules of the game. The various versions of
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the health care voucher plan proposed in the early 1980s by David Stock-
man and Richard Gephardt, for example, would have the federal govern-
ment prescribe the number and kinds of services that would be required
in a minimum health plan, and establish eligibility requirements and
funding levels for vouchers. Similarly, Alain Enthovens Consumer Choice
Health Plan for universal health insurance also established a procompet-
itive strategy on the basis of &dquo;more intelligent use of government&dquo;. Under
this plan, the federal government or states under federal standards would
oversee a system with open enrollment and community-rating proce-
dures, minimum service packages, premium rates set by market area,
catastrophic expense protection, and mandatory disclosure of information
(Enthoven 1980, pp. 126-30). Such a system, or others like it, might in-
deed foster competitive efficiency and ease the pressures of dedistribu-
tion, but it would rely heavily on the regulatory skill of the federal
government. Other options include prevention-oriented strategies, in-
cluding new or expanded forms of health-related regulation. It is not clear,
however, that any of these are likely in the short term to meet the con-
ditions necessary for policy formation, as long as political obstacles are
particularly substantial.
As the federal government searches for new mechanisms to carry
out dedistribution, it will also have to address the issue of intergenera-
tional transfer of resources. The reduction in the proportion of the elderly
population below the poverty line is widely acknowledged as one of the
great triumphs of programs such as Social Security and Medicare. Some
have argued that this achievement has come at considerable cost to younger
Americans, with public sector funding that might have been directed to
the health care, education, and social welfare needs of children and young
adults transferred into entitlement programs for the elderly that are in-
dexed to the inflation rate (Preston 1984). As the Baby Boom generation
matures, an extraordinary imbalance could occur with too few workers
to support too many retirees while maintaining economic growth. In this
situation, the federal government may have to devise new mechanisms
for continuing to assist the elderly while spending less in the process.
Rather than achieving a bigger or smaller federal role in health care, the
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